False Imprisonment at Hospital
Jury Instructions-IL > Intentional Torts > False Imprisonment at Hospital
Rachel Bernard vs. Advocate Health Corp/Christ Hospital 05 M 300851
Battery and False Imprisonment
In a suit for false imprisonment and battery tried in 2006, an 18 year old hospital patient alleged that a security guard blocked her from leaving the hospital until doctor arrived to explain danger of leaving “Against Medical Advice” where she had suffered a serious traumatic head injury. Verdict for the hospital in one hour. Note Missing Witness Instruction and Non-IPI instructions on battery and false imprisonment and notes on use of punitive damages instruction.
1.01 Preliminary Cautionary Instructions
IPI 1.01 – Modified by the court to be read at end of case, and updated by IPI Committee in 2009 to include old IPI 3.01 language)
Now that the evidence has concluded, I will further instruct you as to the law and your duties. The law regarding this case is contained in the instructions I will give to you. You must consider the Court’s instructions as a whole, not picking out some instructions and disregarding others.
It is your duty to resolve this case by determining the facts and following the law given in the instructions. Your verdict must not be based upon speculation, prejudice, or sympathy. Each party, whether a corporation or an individual, should receive your same fair consideration.]
I have not meant to indicate any opinion as to the facts of this case by any of my rulings, remarks, or instructions.
You will decide what facts have been proven. Facts may be proven by evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Evidence consists of the testimony of witnesses and of exhibits admitted by the court. You should consider all the evidence without regard to which party produced it. You may use common sense gained from your experiences in life in evaluating what you see and hear during trial.
You are the only judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You will decide the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In evaluating the credibility of a witness you may consider that witness’ ability and opportunity to observe, memory, manner, interest, bias, qualifications, experience, and any previous inconsistent statement or act by the witness concerning an issue important to the case.
The use of cell phones, text messaging, Internet postings and Internet access devices in connection with your deliberations violates the rules of evidence and you are prohibited from using them
You must make your decision based on what you recall of the evidence. You will not receive a written transcript of the testimony when you retire to the jury room.
An opening statement is what an attorney expects the evidence will be. A closing argument is given at the conclusion of the case and is a summary of what an attorney contends the evidence has shown. If any statement or argument of an attorney is not supported by the law or the evidence you should disregard that statement.
IPI 3.02 Witness Who Has Been Interviewed by Attorney
An attorney may, if a witness agrees, interview a witness to learn what testimony will be given. Such an interview, by itself, does not reflect adversely on the truth of the testimony of the witness.
IPI 3.03 Insurance – Updated in 2009
Whether a party is insured has no bearing whatever on any issue that you must decide. You must refrain from any inference, speculation, or discussion about insurance.
IPI 3.04 Circumstantial Evidence
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of the proof of facts or circumstances which leads to a reasonable inference of the existence of other facts sought to be established.
IPI 5.01 Failure to Produce Witness [or Evidence]
If a party to this case has failed to produce a witness, Rose Bernard, within its power to produce, you may infer that the testimony of the witness would be adverse to that party if you believe each of the following elements:
1. The witness was under the control of the party and could have been produced by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
2. The witness was not equally available to an adverse party.
3. A reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances would have produced the witness if he believed the testimony would be favorable to the party.
4. No reasonable excuse for the failure has been shown.
[SPECIFIC SAMPLE LANGUAGE: If the defendant in this case failed to offer evidence, specifically a video tape of the scene/offer testimony of Dr. Jones, that/who was within his power to produce, you may infer that the evidence/the testimony would be adverse to the defendant if you believe each of the following elements:]
50.11 A Corporation Acts Through Its Employees
The Plaintiff in the case is: Rachel Bernard
The Defendant in the case is: Advocate Health & Hospitals Corporation, doing business as Christ Hospital
The defendant, Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., d/b/a Christ Hospital, is a corporation and can act only through its officers, employees, and agents. Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent within the scope of his employment is the action or omission of the defendant corporation.
14.04 Duty to Refrain From Willful and Wanton Conduct—Defendant/MODIFIED FROM “SECURITY OF PLAINTIFF”
It was the duty of the Defendant before and at the time of the occurrence, to refrain from willful and wanton conduct which would cause damage to the Plaintiff.
14.01 Willful and Wanton Conduct—Definition/MODIFIED FROM “SECURITY OF PLAINTIFF”
When I use the expression “willful and wanton conduct” I mean a course of action which shows actual or deliberate intention to cause damage to the Plaintiff.
NON IPI Definition of Battery [See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13 & 19 (1965); Cohen v. Smith, 269 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1090-1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)]
A person commits a battery if he or she acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another that would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and a harmful contact directly or indirectly results.
NON IPI Definition of False Imprisonment
[See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field, 139 Ill. 3d 1222 (1990)]
False imprisonment is an unreasonable restraint of an individual’s liberty, against his or her will, caused or procured by the defendant.
IPI 15.01 Proximate Cause—Definition [Updated Sept.2009]
When I use the expression “proximate cause,” I mean a cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury. [It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.]
IPI 3.08 – Opinion Testimony [New – 08]
You have heard a witness give opinions about matters requiring knowledge and skill. You should judge this testimony in the same way you judge the testimony from any other witness. The fact that such person has given an opinion does not mean that you are required to accept it. Give the testimony whatever weight you think it deserves, considering the reasons given for the opinion, the witness’ qualifications, and all of the other evidence in the case
20.01.01 Issues Made by the Pleadings—Negligence and Willful and Wanton Counts
Battery Issues Instruction
The plaintiff, Rachel Bernard, claims that she was injured and sustained damages and that the conduct of the defendant, Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., d/b/a Christ Hospital, was willful and wanton in one or more of the following respects:
Did intentionally make offensive physical contact with the Plaintiff by placing hands upon her and pushing her;
Did unlawfully or unreasonably restrain the plaintiff’s liberty by placing hands upon her and pushing her;
Did unlawfully or unreasonably prevent the plaintiff from leaving the hospital room by physically blocking the door;
The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the foregoing was a proximate cause of her damages.
The defendants deny that they did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, deny any willful and wanton in doing any of the things claimed by the plaintiff, and deny that any claimed act or omission on the defendants’ part was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries or damages.
The Defendants further deny that the plaintiff was injured or sustained damages to the extent claimed.
IPI 21.01 – BURDEN OF PROOF
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use the expression “if you find,” or “if you decide,” I mean you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which a party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.
B21.02.02 Burden of Proof on the Issues—Willful and Wanton Counts/B21.03 Burden of Proof on the Issues—
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
First, that the defendant acted or failed to act in one of the ways claimed by the plaintiff as stated to you in these instructions and that in so acting, or failing to act, the defendant was willful and wanton.
Second, that the plaintiff sustained damages.
Third, that the willful and wanton conduct of defendant was a proximate cause of the damages to the plaintiff.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.
On the other hand, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the defendant.
IPI 30.01 Measure of Damages
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate her for any of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the willful and wanton conduct of the defendant, taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of damages.
Damages for a battery, the offensive touching that affronted her human dignity and peace.
Damages for false imprisonment, the restraint of her freedom of movement.
Punitive damages as defined in these instructions.
Whether any of these elements of damages has been proved by the evidence is for you to determine.
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“As to the assault, this is, perhaps, one of that kind, in which the insult is more to be considered than the actual damage; for, though no great bodily pain is suffered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within the definition of assault and battery, and among gentlemen too often induce dueling and terminate in murder.” ( Respublica v. De Longchamps (Pa. 1784), 1 U.S. 111, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. Ed. 59, in Gregory, Kalven, & Epstein, Cases & Materials on Torts 904-905 (1977).) See Also, Arthur v. Lutheran General, 295 Ill App. 3d 818 (1998) and Cohen v. Smith 269 Ill. App. 3d 1087 (1995)
35.01 Punitive/Exemplary Damages—Willful and Wanton Conduct
If you find that the defendant’s conduct was willful and wanton and proximately caused damages to the plaintiff, and if you believe that justice and the public good require it, you may, in addition to any other damages to which you find the plaintiff entitled, award an amount which will serve to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct.
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[2007 ipis]35.01 Punitive/Exemplary Damages – Willful and Wanton Conduct
In addition to compensatory damages, the law permits you under certain circumstances to award
punitive damages. If you find that __________________ conduct was [fraudulent] [intentional]
(Defendant’s name)
[willful and wanton]and proximately caused [injury] [damage] to the plaintiff, and if you
believe that justice and the public good require it, you may award an amount of money which
will punish _________________ and discourage [it/him/her] and others from similar conduct.
(Defendant’s name)
In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages, you should consider the
following three questions. The first question is the most important to determine the amount of
punitive damages:
1. How reprehensible was _________________ conduct?
(Defendant’s name)
On this subject, you should consider the following:
a) The facts and circumstances of defendant’s conduct;
b) The [financial] vulnerability of the plaintiff;
c) The duration of the misconduct;
d) The frequency of defendant’s misconduct;
e) Whether the harm was physical as opposed to economic;
f) Whether defendant tried to conceal the misconduct;
[g) other]2. What actual and potential harm did defendant’s conduct cause to the plaintiff in this case?
3. What amount of money is necessary to punish defendant and discourage defendant and
others from future wrongful conduct [in light of defendant’s financial condition]?
[In assessing the amount of punitive damages, you may not consider defendant’s similar conductin jurisdictions where such conduct was lawful when it was committed.]
The amount of punitive damages must be reasonable [and in proportion to the actual and
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.]
Instruction, Notes and Comment revised January 2007.
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35.01
NOTES ON USE
This instruction should be given in conjunction with IPI 14.01 when punitive damages
could be awarded. The U.S. Supreme Court has provided direction to courts for instructing a jury
in punitive damages in cases, culminating with State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
The phrase “financial vulnerability” comes from State Farm and B.M.W. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996). By context, it appears that the jury should also be permitted to consider other
vulnerabilities if such evidence is in the record.
In identifying factors to consider concerning defendant’s reprehensibility, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not limit other factors the jury may consider. If appropriate, and if additional
factors are present in the evidence, the court may instruct the jury to consider them.
“Financial condition” is bracketed because it is not necessary for a defendant’s financial
condition to be in evidence for a jury to award punitive damages. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill.2d 192,
204 (1989); Ford v. Herman, 316 Ill.App.3d 726, 734-735 (5th Dist. 2000).
The next to last paragraph should be used only in those cases like State Farm where
conduct that may give rise to punitive damages in the forum state may be lawful in other states.
There must be a basis in the evidence of such extra-jurisdictional conduct and its lawfulness to
warrant the inclusion of this bracketed paragraph.
The idea of proportionality of the punitive award to the compensatory award is expressed
in State Farm v. Campbell and BMW v. Gore. The Court did not specify what “in proportion”
means. The Court refused to approve a punitive award that was 145 times the compensatory
award. State Farm, supra at 429. The Court included language favoring a single digit multiplier.
(“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in the range of 500 to 1 … or,
in this case, 145 to 1,” State Farm, supra at 425) See Mathias v. Accord Economy Lodging, 347
F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2003); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 340 Or. 35 (2005), pet. grtd., 126 S.Ct.
2329 (2006). Instructing a jury concerning “proportionality” was not mandated or prohibited by
State Farm or by Illinois case law. Whether the bracketed language concerning “proportionality”
should be included in the instruction should be decided on a case by case basis.
35.01
COMMENT
Where punitive damages may be assessed, they are allowed in the nature of punishment
and as a warning and example to deter the defendant and others from committing like offenses in
the future. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 186 (1978); Loitz v. Remington Arms
Company, 135 Ill.2d 404, 415-416 (1990); and Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d
31, 35 (1975).
The Illinois Supreme Court established that a reviewing court would “not disturb an
award of punitive damages on grounds that an amount is excessive unless it is apparent that the
award is a result of passion, partiality or corruption.” Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill.2d 192, 204 (1989).
There were no clear guidelines in Illinois for determining when a punitive damages award was
excessive. Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 114 Ill.App.3d 703, 711 (4th Dist. 1983).
Relevant circumstances that a reviewing court should consider in determining whether a punitive
damage award was excessive were to include the nature and enormity of the wrong, the financial
status of the defendant, and the potential liability of the defendant. Deal v. Byford, supra at 204,
citing Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, supra at 712-713.
In a series of cases beginning in 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely faced the
question of what constituted an excessive punitive damage award. Browning-Ferris Industries
of Vermont, Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S 1 (1991); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); BMW of North America v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996); Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001);
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
In BMW v. Gore, supra, the Court declared that constitutional principles embodied in the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment required that reviewing courts use three “guideposts”
to determine whether a punitive damage award was excessive:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility;
(2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damage award;
(3) the difference between the punitive damage award and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
BMW v. Gore, supra, State Farm v Campbell, supra, International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 150 v. Lowe, __ Ill.2d __, 2006 WL 3493047 (2006) and cited in Turner v.
First Star Bank, 363 Ill.App.3d 1150, 1163 (5th Dist. 2006). Of these guideposts, “the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damage award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” BMW v. Gore, supra at 575 “Reprehensibility” is a
quality the Supreme Court asks reviewing courts to recognize through careful consideration of
the following factors:
(1) Whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
(2) Whether the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless
disregard of the health or safety of others;
(3) Whether the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
(4) Whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and
(5) Whether the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery,
deceit or mere accident. International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 150 v. Lowe, supra.
While any punitive damages imposed should reflect the enormity of the tortfeasor’s
offense, BMW, 517 U.S. at 525, the second guidepost – the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered and the punitive award – reminds the reviewing court that the award
should not be “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense,” Id. citing Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 122 (1991). The Court has indicated its reluctance “to
identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between the harm, or potential harm, to the
plaintiff and the punitive damage award,” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424, citing BMW 517 U.S. at
582. While refusing a “bright line ratio” above which punitive damages cannot exceed, the
Court did suggest that “few awards exceeding single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” Campbell, 338 U.S. at
425.
In translating this concept of proportionality, the Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F3d. 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) held not
only that “punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s
actions,” but also that “the punishment should fit the crime.” Still, the Seventh Circuit avoided
any semblance of rigid measurement by embracing the challenges that extreme examples of bad
acts might pose to a jury. In other words, proportionality may be “modified when the probability
of detection is very low (a familiar example is the heavy fines for littering) or the crime is
potentially lucrative (as in the case of trafficking in illegal drugs).” Id.
Before State Farm v. Campbell, (2003), the Illinois Supreme Court last addressed the
concept of proportionality in a 1989 decision, Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (1989), it said
“There is no requirement that the amount of punitive damages imposed on a defendant bear any
particular proportion to the size of the plaintiff’s compensatory recovery.” No subsequent
pronouncement has been made by the Court. Nevertheless, the concept of proportionality as
expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court has surfaced, relatively intact, in Illinois appellate
decisions, such as Turner v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 363 Ill.App.3d 1150 (5th Dist. 2006) (reducing
punitive damages to an amount that would be less than the double-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages against which the Campbell Court cautioned); Franz v. Calaco
Development, 352 Ill.App.3d 1129 (2nd Dist. 2004) (“While the amount to be awarded in
punitive damages rests largely within the province of the jury, that “discretion” is not arbitrary or
unlimited”); and Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 114 Ill.App.3d 703, 713 (4th
Dist.1983) (“recognizing that punitive damages are in the nature of a criminal sanction, we are
simply saying that the punishment should fit the crime. An award which is disproportionate to
the wrong serves none of the purposes of punitive damages and is excessive.”).
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The Illinois Supreme Court recently reduced a punitive damages award to a ratio of 11:1
from an Appellate Court remittitur to 75:1 in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
150 v. Lowe, supra. The Court discussed the idea of proportionality and the Mathias v. Accor
Economy Lodging, Inc., supra, decision.
Cognizant of the fact that its admonishments were directed to reviewing courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also indicated that vague instructions that merely inform the jury to avoid
“passion or prejudice” do little to aid the decision maker in its tasks of assigning appropriate
weight to evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory. State Farm v. Campbell, supra at
418. The Committee in revising the jury instructions addressing punitive damages, sought to
honor the three constitutional “guideposts” established by U.S. Supreme Court while
simultaneously emphasizing that the ultimate determination as to the size of the penalty imposed
must be dictated by the circumstances of each particular case. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill.2d 192,
205 (1989). “Even though the assessment of punitive damages is not a purely factual finding, it
is a “fact sensitive” undertaking. Franz, 352 Ill.App.3d at 1143, citing Cooper Industries, Inc.,
532 U.S. at 437. Room is to be left for relatively high punitive damage awards in situations
where particularly loathsome acts resulted in but small amounts of measurable economic
damages. Turner, 363 Ill.App.3d 1150, 1164, citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
The Committee formulated an instruction that incorporated the distinguishing factors of
reprehensibility. Precisely which factor must be included in an instruction submitted to a jury is
case specific and to be carefully weighed. For instance, the Campbell, opinion suggests that the
jury consider whether the harm was physical rather than economic, yet, experience allows that
under certain circumstances an economic loss willfully created can be equally as devastating to a
plaintiff. Regardless, in any punitive assessment, the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct must be the pivotal consideration.
The Committee is also of the opinion that current definitions of the term “willful and
wanton” (14.01) and “proximate cause” (15.01) are plainly stated, well settled under current
Illinois law and not inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The instructions were
designed to provide guidance to a jury that must determine whether punitive damages should be
awarded at all; and if so, how to go about the process of evaluating the defendant’s misconduct
in light of their own experience and the facts of the case.
The Committee also considered the following cases: Home Savings & Loan Assoc. v.
Schneider, 108 Ill.2d 277 (1985); Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill.App.3d 265 (1st Dist. 1997);
Heldenbrand v. Roadmaster Corp., 277 Ill.App.3d 664 (5th Dist. 1996).
35.02 Punitive/Exemplary Damages–Willful and Wanton Conduct–Corporate Defendant’s Liability
___________________ is a corporation and can act only through its officers and
(Defendant’s name)
employees. As to plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages against ____________________,
(Defendant’s name)
any act or omission of an officer or employee within the scope of his employment is the action or
omission of the defendant corporation.
As to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against __________________, a different
(Defendant’s name)
rule applies. Punitive damages may be awarded against __________________ only (1) if
(Defendant’s name)
you find in favor of plaintiff(s) and against _______________________ under Count
(Defendant’s name)
__ of the complaint, and (2) if you find that, as to the act(s) or omission(s) giving rise to liability
under Count __, [_________________________.] [one or (more) (both) of the
State condition (a), (b), (c) or(d)
following conditions (is) (are) proved:]
[ (a) ] [The corporation, through its management, authorized the doing and the manner of the
act or omission] [; or]
[ (b) ] [The employee responsible for the act or omission was unfit, and the corporation was
reckless in employing him] [; or]
[ (c) ] [The act or omission was that of a managerial employee who was acting in the scope of
his employment] [; or]
[ (d) ] [The corporation, through its management or a managerial employee, ratified or
approved the act or omission].
Instruction, Notes and Comment approved January 2007
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Notes on Use
This instruction should be given with IPI 35.01 in any case in which a submissible case
for punitive damages has been made and such damages are sought against a corporate defendant.
Use the appropriate subparagraphs (a) – (d), depending on the facts of the case.
Additional agency instructions may be used as appropriate. See Chapter 50.
Comment
This instruction is based on the requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
909 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 217C. Those sections have been cited in
Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d 31 (1975); Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill.2d 192 (1989);
Kennan v. Checker Taxi Co., 250 Ill.App.3d 155 (1st Dist. 1993); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 217
Ill.App.3d 188, 207 (5th Dist. 1991); Bryant v. Livigni, 250 Ill.App.3d 303, 311 (5th Dist. 1993);
Abshire v. Stoller, 235 Ill.App.3d 849, 857-859 (1st Dist. 1992).
This instruction embodies the “corporate complicity” concept which is necessary for an
award of punitive damages against a corporation. Mere proof of scope and course conduct of an
agent is insufficient to impose punitive damages against a corporation. Kemner v. Monsanto Co.,
supra at 208, discussed the error of giving a simple agency instruction (IPI 50.11) when
corporate liability for punitive damages is at issue. See also Kochan v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 242 Ill.App.3d 781, 797-798 (5th Dist. 1993).
IPI.36.01 In Absence of Liability—No Occasion to Consider Damages
If you decide for the defendant on the question of liability, you will have no occasion to consider the question of damages.
B45.01 – FORMS OF VERDICT – NO COMPARATIVE
When you retire to the jury room you will first select a foreperson. He or she will preside during your deliberations.
Your verdict must be unanimous.
Forms of verdicts are supplied with these instructions. After you have reached your verdict, fill in and sign the appropriate form of verdict and return it to the court. Your verdict must be signed by each of you. You should not write or mark upon this or any of the other instructions given to you by the court.
The Plaintiff in the case is: Rachel Bernard
The Defendant in the case is: Advocate Health & Hospitals Corporation, doing business as Christ Hospital
If you find for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, then you should use Verdict Form A.
If you find for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, then you should use Verdict Form B.
IPI B45.01.A – VERDICT FORM A
VERDICT FORM A
We, the jury, find for the Plaintiff, Rachel Bernard, and against the Defendant, Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., d/b/a Christ Hospital. We assess the damages
in the sum of $____________________, itemized as follows:
Damages for a battery $____________________
Damages for false imprisonment $____________________
Punitive damages $____________________
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(Foreperson)
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VERDICT FORM B
*IPI4501.C
We, the jury, find for the Defendant, Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., d/b/a Christ Hospital, and against the Plaintiff, Rachel Bernard.
[Signature Lines ]—————————————————– —————————————————-
(Foreperson)
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